We examine the e¤ect of large cash transfers on the consumption of food by poor households in rural Mexico. The transfers represent 20% of household income on average, and yet, the budget share of food is unchanged following receipt of this money. This is an important puzzle to solve, particularly so in the context of a social welfare programme designed in part to improve nutrition of individuals in the poorest households. We estimate an Engel curve for food. We rule out price increases, changes in the quality of food consumed and homotheticity of preferences as explanations for this puzzle. We also show that food is a necessity, with a strong negative e¤ect of income on the food budget share. The decrease in food budget share caused by the large increase in income is cancelled by some other relevant aspect of the programme so that the net e¤ect is nil. We argue that the program has not changed preferences and that there is no labelling of money. We propose that the key to the puzzle resides in the fact that the transfer is put in the hands of women and that the change in control over household resources is what leads to the observed changes in behaviour.
Introduction
Conditional cash transfer programmes, such as Oportunidades in Mexico, have recently received considerable attention among policy makers and academics alike. Many of these programmes have brought to light an interesting fact: following the injection of relatively large amounts of cash in the budget of poor households, the share of the budget devoted to food is unchanged and, in some cases, even increased. This is in stark contradiction with what is universally observed regarding the relationship between household income and expenditure on food. There is a well known negative relationship, …rst documented by Engel in the 19th century, between total expenditure and the budget share of food, so that following the increase in household income induced by the program, food budget shares are expected to decrease.
Yet, in Mexico as in a number of other countries, the opposite takes place when total expenditure is increased by a conditional cash transfer: sizeable cash transfers to women have been found to be associated with constant or higher shares of expenditure on food in Ecuador (Schady, Rosero 2008) , Colombia (Attanasio, Battistin, Mesnard, 2008 (ABM08) ), urban areas of Mexico (Angelucci, Attanasio, 2008) and other countries (WB report, 2009 ).
The income e¤ect appears to be exactly cancelled by some other relevant aspect of the programme, so that the net e¤ect of CCT programmes on the share of food is nil or, in some cases, positive.
Conditional cash transfer programmes were put in place to improve investment in human capital in the dimension of education, health and nutrition. The large amounts of cash given to households are designed to enable households to send children to school where otherwise the children would not go to school, by providing a replacement income where the children used to work. They are also designed to enable better nutrition; both by relaxing the budget constraint, and by educating women as to the health bene…ts of a good nutrition. Most of them are explicitly targeted to women in that 1 the cash transfers is received by them and in that they have among their objectives the improvement of women conditions.
It is important to assess how the conditional cash transfer programmes in ‡uence food consumption; whether they meet the intended goal of improving nutrition; and to establish the channels through which they impact on behaviour. However, prior to the implementation of Oportunidades; little was known about the very poor and rural population of interest and how the programme would a¤ect behaviour.
The goal of this work is twofold. The …rst goal is to characterise food demand for this population of poor households in rural Mexico. We accomplish this objective by estimating a demand system for the population in our sample. This exercise is of interest because little is known about food consumption of very poor households in general and in rural Mexico in particular. Estimation of demand systems on micro data is still rare and a number of methodological issues still require attention.
The second goal is to investigate the channels through which the transfer a¤ects behaviour. Putting a structural interpretation on the observed phenomenon is what will enable to transport to other contexts and to improve on the design of welfare programmes.
Several mechanisms could have led to the observed changes (or otherwise) in the share of food. It could be that changes in the share of food are linked to changes in local prices. If this is the case, assessing the e¤ect of the programme on welfare requires that careful attention is paid to modelling the activity and behaviour of households that are producer-consumers. For such households, the net e¤ect of a price increase depends on the e¤ect on income generated through sale of home produced goods, on the e¤ect on expenditure on foods purchased on the market and on the opportunity cost of home produced goods. Here however, the population under investigation is so poor that few households are producer-consumers, and the value of production consumed is very small (cf Attanasio, Di Maro, Lechene, Phillips, 2009 ). There still remains the question of whether food prices increased concommitantly to the programme or because of the programme.
Alternatively, it could be that food is a luxury in the populations under investigation at very low levels of income. If that was the case, one would observe that the food share would increase for the poorest house-holds and decrease for the least poor, so that in the aggregate one could observe either e¤ect. It could also be that preferences of poor households in Latin America are homothetic. The universality of Engel's law, according to which food is a necessity and its relationship with income is negative has been empirically established using data from the North American continent and Europe, but few large data sets linking consumption and income for Latin America existed until the implementation of social welfare programmes such as Oportunidades in Mexico, and F amilias en Accion in Colombia. Although it is unclear why households in Latin America would be di¤erent from households in Europe and North America, this cannot be ruled out on a priori grounds.
It could also be that the programme induces changes in preferences for quality of food, for instance because of the information about the importance of good nutrition for health. One important component of the programme is education on the bene…ts of healthy nutrition habits. Evaluating the impact of information on behaviour is important again for the design of cost e¤ective welfare programmes. However, in this case, it is not clear what to expect on the budget share of food following the transfer. Improvements in nutrition might, but would not necessarily, lead to increased food budget shares, if the increase in quality and expenditure on food are proportionally greater than the increase in income. Without induced changes in preferences, the expected e¤ect of monetary transfers to households is simple: if food is a necessity, the budget share of food should decrease as well as those of the necessities and inferior goods within the food basket, while the shares of luxuries should increase.
Another possibility that needs to be considered is that there is labeling of money, so that money received from a government agency is spent differently from money generated from labour supply choices. This e¤ect has been also researched in the context of federal government transfers to local government. In this context, it is usually referred to as the ‡y paper e¤ect.
Regarding transfers to households, Kooreman (2000) investigates labeling of money.
Finally, it could be that the conditional cash transfer programme a¤ects household decisions through yet another channel. Indeed, all conditional cash transfer programmes in which a constant or higher food budget share has been reported following the injection of large amount of cash have the common feature that the transfer is paid to women. It could thus be that the increase in the share of resources held by women changes outcomes over and above the change induced by the transfer on the budget constraint. This could occur even if food is normal for both household members.
To summarise, a constant budget share of food could result from an increase in the price of food, from food being a luxury, from homothetic preferences, from modi…cations in preferences leading to the purchase of better quality food, from labeling of money or from the impact of the transfer on decision making.
The main results of the paper are as follows. Conditional cash transfers have a double e¤ect on choices. The …rst e¤ect, induced by the increase in the total income of the household, is the expected negative e¤ect on the budget share of food. Further to showing that food is a necessity and that preferences are not homothetic, we also show that prices of food have not increased. We argue that it is unlikely that the programme induces changes in preferences and we similarly …nd no grounds to the labeling of money hypothesis. The second e¤ect of the programme is to raise the budget share of food by an amount matching the decrease due to the income e¤ect.
We argue that the only aspect of this, and other similar conditional cash programmes, which can explain the puzzle, is the fact that the transfer is put in the hands of women. Once we account for this shift in the Engel curve for food, the impact of the programme as evaluated by the structural estimates is in line with the impact observed on the raw data. In other words, there is an impact of the transfer on decision making, over and above its e¤ect on the budget constraint.
We follow Attanasio, Battistin, Mesnard (2009, henceforth ABM09) who estimate an Engel curve for food using data from a conditional cash transfer similar to Oportunidades for poor households in rural Colombia. They establish the form of the Engel curve for food and document the e¤ect of the programme. They …nd that instrumenting total expenditure is particularly crucial. Without instrumenting, food is a luxury at low levels of total expenditure and a necessity at higher levels. Instrumenting with an exogenous measure of expected income, food is found to be a necessity everywhere. ABM09 use comparison of structural and quasi-experimental estimates to inform functional form choice. They …nd that the ‡exibility of a QUAIDS model, in which the coe¢ cient on the square of the logarithm of total expenditure depends on prices, is essential in this context. Since they do not observe prices, they use village dummies to proxy for prices, in which case it is not possible to use village wages as an instrument for total expenditure.
Given that we have partial information on prices, we take a similar route and control for spatial di¤erences in relative prices with regional indicators.
We also follow Hoddinott and Skou…as (2004) who examine the e¤ect of Oportunidades on food consumption. They pay particular attention to the survey design and practical aspects of the implementation of the programme.
They …nd that there is an e¤ect of the transfers on calorie intakes over and above the income e¤ect of the transfer.
In section 2, we describe the Mexican context, the Oportunidades programme and the data collected for its evaluation. We present the sample used in the analysis and discuss the construction of prices. We document the fact that food budget shares are constant after households receive large cash transfers. In this section, we also show that the solution to the puzzle is not an increase in prices or a change in the quality of food consumed. In section 3, we revisit a number of methodological issues that arise when estimating Engel curves. Among these issues are the choice of functional form for the Engel curve and the instrumenting of total expenditure. We also detail two speci…c issues that arise in this context. The …rst one concerns the minimum school attendance requirement imposed by the conditionality of the programme, which might have bearing on food consumption. The second speci…c issue in this context is the fact that although we are interested in the estimation of an Engel curve, there exist spatial di¤erences in relative prices which need to be accounted for. A further di¢ culty is that prices are only partially observed. Section 4 details the estimation results. We show that food is a necessity for poor households in rural Mexico. We show that a standard Engel curve fails to predict the e¤ect of the programme. We further show how to modify the Engel curve to obtain predictions matching the observed e¤ects. Section 5 summarises the results and discusses the implications of our preferred speci…cation. Section 6 concludes. The price subsidies and transfers in kind of previous programmes are replaced by monetary transfers; evaluation is conducted from the beginning of the programme; possibilities of appropriation of the programme money are removed by using private banks and other institutions to deliver the cash, and …nally, the transfers are put in the hands of women. Women's role and involvement in the programme has been heralded as one of the keys of its success. We will come back to this aspect below.
At the start in 1997, 300,000 families were programme bene…ciaries, for 5 million now, or 25 million individuals representing 25% of the population. Oportunidades has the largest budget of all human development programmes. Hoddinott and Skou…as (2004) The data The means of the evaluation of the e¤ect of the programme was built in from the start, with randomisation of recipients and regular surveys of the populations treated and of control populations. In particular, the evaluation exploited the fact that the expansion of the programme to the population targeted in the …rst phase would take about two years. The …rst phase of the programme was targeted to villages identi…ed as poor, but in possession of a certain level of amenities in terms of school and health provision. Of the 10,000 localities included in the …rst expansion phase, 506 localities were included in the evaluation sample and 320 of them were randomly chosen to have an early start of the programme (in June 1998), while the remaining 186 were put 'at the end of the queue' and were excluded from the programme until the last months of 1999. In the 320 'treated' villages, the households that in the initial (August 1997 and March 1998) surveys quali…ed as eligible, started receiving the cash transfers (subject to the appropriate conditionalities) in June 1998, while in the 186 'control'villages, although households were de…ned as eligible or non-eligible in the same fashion as in the treatment villages, no payment was made until November 1999.
In the evaluation sample, extensive surveys were administered roughly every six months from August 1997 to November 2000. In each of the selected villages, the survey is a census. We use two survey waves, October 1998 and May 1999. In subsequent survey waves, starting from November 1999, poor households in control villages start being incorported in the programme and receive part or all of the transfer they are entitled to by the programme.
The aim of the programme is to increase human capital investment of the poorest households in rural Mexico, through investment in education, health and nutrition. The grants have three components, designed to address these three aims. The amount of the education grant varies with the gender and age of the child, from 65 pesos for a boy in third grade to 240 pesos for a girl in third grade in secondary school (Hoddinott and Skou…as, 2004) . At the start of the school year, another component of the education grant is paid to bene…ciary households, towards the cost of school supplies. The education grants are capped at 490 pesos per month and per household from January to June 1998 rising to 625 pesos from July to December 1999 (Hoddinott and Skou…as, 2004) . The grants are paid to the households every two months.
Several practical aspects pertaining to the implementation of the programme are relevant for the analysis. Oportunidades is a conditional cash transfer programme, in the sense that receipt of the grants is conditional on the ful…llment of criterions further to the fact of being identi…ed as poor in the sense of the program. The …rst set of conditions regards schooling. Receipt of the education grant is conditional on school attendance. In practice, nearly all children go to primary school, and the programme mainly targets secondary and "preparatoria" school age children. Other conditions are to do with health checks and attendance to meetings for mothers of young children. The grants are paid to the women, in person, by private bank employees, on the basis of ful…llment of the programme conditions during the preceeding period.
The sample Our interest is in the e¤ect of the programme on outcomes for the poor, so that we select a sub sample of households considered as eligible for the programme in 1997, residing either in control or treatment villages. In order to work with a homogenous sample in terms of number of decision makers, we also select households in which there are no more than two adults and any number of children. The sample contains 14,397 households, of which 7,400 observed in October 1998 and 6,997 observed in May 1999. Of these, 62.47% (8994 households) are in treatment villages and 37.53% (5403 households) are in control villages.
In Table 1 , we report some descriptive statistics from our sample. In the …rst column, we report the average of each of the relevant variables in the control sample, while in the second, we report the same average in the treatment sample. A formal comparison of the two averages shows that the two samples are balanced, as reported in Behrman and Todd (1999) .
The sample re ‡ects the fact that we are dealing with a very poor population. The food budget share is on average 80% of total expenditure 1 . 1 We include a valuation of in-kind consumption.
Education of both head and spouse are low 2 . About 60% of the sample has primary education only. The average family size is 6. Just under 40% of households are of indigenous origin. The sample is drawn from 7 di¤erent states (Guerrero, Puebla, San Luis Potosi, Michoacan, Queretaro, Veracruz and Hidalgo). About a quarter of the localities have a secondary school in the village. Few households have relatives or other outsiders eating in the house, and similarly few household members declare eating outside the house. We will control for this in the empirical analysis to correct for the direct e¤ect on food expenditure of either. 
Construction of prices for non durables
Under the assumption of two stage budgetting, food consumption is determined by reference to the price of food, the prices of other non durables, and total expenditure on non durables. We are interested in the relationship between total expenditure (on non durables) and the budget share of food, but given that the survey covers a large geographical area, it is conceivable that there are spatial di¤erences in the relative price of food versus non food items of non durable consumption. To control for this, we would ideally control for the relative price of food in the food Engel curve. However, whilst it is possible to construct unit values for food stu¤, this is not possible for other non durables. The survey records purchases of non durables over a period of one week for transport and tobacco, one month for personal hygiene, cleaning products, drugs, medical visits, school fees, and heating and lighting of the house and six months for utensils for the house, toys for children, clothes and shoes for all household members and ceremonies. The infrequency of purchases of these articles over the time periods stipulated is such that there are numerous households who report no purchases of these items over the period of observation. For twelve out of sixteen expenditure categories, the fraction of zeros is greater than 50%. Moreover, for most of these commodities, we only observe expenditure, unlike for food items where we also observe quantity. Therefore, it is not possible to construct unit values at the household level or even at the village level for the prices of these goods given the large proportion of zeros.
An alternative to the use of unit values is to use shop prices. It is the case that locality level information on prices has been collected in separate questionnaires from the household questionnaires, at the same survey dates as the household questionnaires. Unfortunately data on locality prices is available only for a very small number of localities. 3 This discussion shows that it is not possible to construct credible variables of price information for non durables. This means that the question of how to control for spatial di¤erence in relative prices must be dealt by proxying for relative price di¤erences. One possibility is to use village indicators. However, in our context, where we have observations from 506 villages and two time periods, this is not an appealing route. Not only is it computationally cumbersome, but it also would preclude the use of village level variation in any other dimension. Moreover, it would imply assuming di¤erences in relative prices across localities which are occasionally relatively close. Therefore we follow a pragmatic approach and allow for di¤erences in relative prices in a given time periods across states, but assume that relative prices are constant within a state at a point in time. In the empirical analysis, therefore, we will be using state level dummy variables to control for spatial di¤erences in relative prices.
E¤ect of the program on the budget share of food
Given the availability of the experimental setup, we can estimate the impact of the programme on total expenditure and on the share of food in a very simple way and with a minimal set of assumptions. These include the fact that there is no e¤ect (maybe through anticipation) on the control localities.
The impact can then be simply obtained comparing averages in treatment and control localities. In Table 2 we report the mean of the distribution of total non durable consumption and of the share of food in treatment and control villages both in October 1998 and in May 1999. The program, not surprisingly, increases the consumption of non durables considerably.
In May 1999, the increase is 17%, which, when converted in pesos, is still less than the amount of the grant, which accounted for about 20-25% of total consumption on average. The increase in October 1998, when the programme had only just started, is considerably smaller, but still sizeable at 7%. Such a modest increase might be justi…ed by the fact that the programme was not necessarily perceived as permanent at its inception and by administrative delays in the …rst few payments. The evidence on total consumption is consistent with that in the literature and the fact that the increase in total consumption is below the amount of the grant has been noted by Gertler, Martinez and Rubio-Codina (2009) .
The standard errors of the di¤erences in the total log consumption are respectively 0.011 and 0.012 for October 1998 and May 1999. Given the value of the corresponding di¤erences (respectively 0.07 and 0.17), the di¤erences in mean log consumption expenditure between control and treatment villages are signi…cant. However, turning now to the di¤erences between the food budget shares in control and treatment villages, we …nd that we cannot reject that these are zero. The standard error of the di¤erence is 0.03 in both periods, associated with di¤erences of 0.48% and 0.70% respectively. It is therefore the case that in Mexico, as in other countries where similar programmes have been operating, the share of food is constant after the transfer. A priori, the increase in income and total expenditure induced by the programme should lead to a decrease in the budget share of food, if food is a necessity. The simple comparison we present on the raw data shows that the share of food is constant after the introduction of the programme.
Prices and quality of food
Prices paid and the quality of food purchased can vary so as to generate constant or higher shares of food. This can happen in several manners.
The amounts transferred by the programme are important and it could be that such large injection of cash has an e¤ect on the local food markets.
Increased demand for food stu¤ may lead to price increases, in which case the transfer does not necessarily reach its intended bene…ciaries. Alternatively, it could be that to some extent, households substitute higher quality of foods following receipt of the transfer. This would be a desirable outcome of the programme.
The data should ideally enable to answer these questions directly by examining whether the prices paid for given quality have increased and whether the quality of the food purchased has changed. However, neither qualities nor prices for given qualities are observed. Instead, we observe expenditures and quantities of food items, from which we construct unit values. An increase in unit value can be due to an increase in price for constant quality or an incrase in quality of foods purchased. The unit values are constructed using information on expenditure and quantity from purchase data from individual households, then aggreggated to the village level.
A given village is either control or treatment. Prices are constructed using information on quantities purchased and expenditure, at the village level. Therefore, to see whether the price of food increases with the program, we compare prices of the …ve food groups which compose the food basket, in treatment and in control villages. The absence of di¤erence between budget shares of households in control and treated villages is not due to increased prices, and since we are looking
at unit values, we can also rule out increased quality of the foods purchased.
The next step is to rule out that this is due to homothetic preferences or to food being a luxury. To do so, it is necessary to estimate an Engel curve for food. We now turn to a number of issues that need addressing in order to do so.
Engel curve for food: Methodological issues
We are interested in the understanding the e¤ect of the CCT programme on the budget share of food. To this end, we propose to estimate an Engel curve for food, that is the relationship between income (or total expenditure) and the budget share of food, conditioning on relevant preference shifters and characteristics of the environment. Assuming that households maximise a utility function subject to a household budget constraint, the Engel curve is speci…ed so as to be theory consistent, allowing to relate the results obtained here to results obtained when studying the demand system for foods in how to deal with the fact that some pertinent information, namely prices, is not observed for part of the system.
Functional form: Aids or Quaids
In the context of the estimation of an Engel curve, the question of whether the demand for the good is derived from an Aids or a Quaids is the question of how income responses are allowed to vary with income.
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and the generalisation suggested by Banks, Blundell and Lewbell (1997) to the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS)
are both integrable. The latter allows for more ‡exible relationship between income and expenditure shares. In the case of interest here, it is important to allow for the possibility that a good might be a luxury at very low levels of income and a necessity afterwards, which is not possible with an AIDS. This would be consonant with the idea that for poor households at subsistence level, there might be some indivisibilities in the allocation of the budget so that as the budget constraint is relaxed, the budget share of food might initially increase, making food a luxury at very low levels of income 6 . In the event, we will reject this possibility, but it is worth noting that this can only be done in the framework of a quadratic Engel curve, ie corresponding to an underlying Quaids.
In a Quaids, the budget shares take the following form:
where w i is the share of commodity i in total expenditure on goods, x is total expenditure on goods and a(p); b(p) and are price indexes de…ned by the following equations:
For this model to be consistent with utility maximisation, the following theoretical restrictions have to hold.
For adding-up:
For homogeneity, the following additional restriction has to hold as well:
And …nally, for symmetry:
For homogeneity to hold, the price index a(p) must be homogenous of degree 1 in prices and expenditure, and b(p) homogenous of degree 0.
In this model, the income elasticity is
where
In these equations, demographics are assumed to enter in the intercept term of the shares equations. In particular, for commodity i we assume that the parameter i is given by the following expression:
where the z k are the K demographic variables that enter the system. Homogeneity implies the additional restrictions:
As discussed in BBL, the demand system in equation (1) combines functional form ‡exibility to consistency with theory, in that it is integrable.
The last term in equation (1) makes the demand system of rank 3, the highest admissible rank for a theory-consistent demand system that is exactly aggregable, in that it is linear in functions of total expenditure.
In the case of Aids, the budget shares take the form
where a(p) is the price index de…ned as before.
Consistency with theory is obtained if the same restrictions as those that need to be veri…ed in the case of the Quaids are veri…ed, except the restriction on the coe¢ cient on the quadratic term in total expenditure.
In this model, the income elasticity has the same form as in the Quaids, again with the coe¢ cient on the quadratic term in total expenditure set to zero, so that if i > 0; the good is a luxury at all levels of income.
Endogeneity of total expenditure on food
Under the assumption of two stage budgeting, households decide how much to allocate to each period and then how to allocate total expenditure in the period between the di¤erent goods. If unobserved taste shifters for goods are correlated with heterogeneity in time preference, for instance if impatient individuals are also more hedonistic, then total expenditure is endogenous.
Measurement error in total expenditure is also a likely cause of endogeneity.
One often used instrument is household income, if the measurement error in total expenditure does not a¤ect income. Under the assumption that heterogeneity in tastes is the source of endogeneity of total expenditure, income is a valid instrument if labour supply is separable from consumption.
Even if these assumptions do not fail, so that income is uncorrelated with the errors in the demand equation, income can be a poor instrument in a context where large transitory shocks may weaken the relationship between income and total expenditure. An alternative is the wage, exogenous in demand if leisure is separable from commodities in the preferences. Another candidate is to use a locality level measure of the price of leisure. This has the double advantage to get around the problem of endogeneity due to non separability, as well as measurement error of the wage. However, this is mitigated by the fact that by using a locality level variable, we are losing the dimension of individual variability, which can be presumed quite important. Furthermore, this precludes the use of locality level variables to capture other relevant aspects, in particular to proxy for unobserved prices, as we explain below.
We report below the results we obtain with income and then with median locality level agricultural wage as instrument for total expenditure on food.
In the context of rural households, whose activity is in part or mainly agricultural, it is potentially important to control for consumption of home produced goods. The survey records the quantity consumed of 36 food items, and whether these are purchased or home produced. We value the home produced consumption using local village level unit values computed using information on purchases of the same foods. We …nd that home produced consumption represents less than 6% of consumption.
Schooling
Conditional cash transfer programmes impose minimum schooling requirements for children of the recipient households. The opportunity cost of schooling is one of the reasons put forward as a reason for the low school attendance of children in rural Mexico. The grant amounts are devised with the aim to cover the opportunity cost of schooling for the household, which is why they vary with the age and gender of the child. The conditionality might a¤ect consumption behaviour if sending children to school imposes related costs, such as for uniforms, shoes or books. Conversely, children might be fed in school, which would also have an impact on the budget share of food. It is thus necessary to control for schooling of children, over and above controlling for household composition. However, it could be that unobserved taste for school is correlated with unobserved taste for certain foods, so that schooling could be endogenous in the demand system. To allow for this possibility, we instrument schooling with distance from primary school, an indicator for the existence of a secondary school and distance from secondary school if it is not in the village.
Controlling for partially observed prices
When estimating the food Engel curve, under the maintained assumption of separability between durables and non durables in preferences, we do not need to control for prices. However, it is the case that relative prices of foods di¤er between villages, and furthermore the price of food relative to other non durable might vary, which needs to be accounted for in the empirical application. As we mentioned above, it is not possible to construct prices for non durables using this data, because of the large proportion of zero in the purchase data.
There are three possibilities. The …rst possibility is that we could use village dummies for prices in the food Engel curve. In this case, we would not be able to use the village level agricultural wage as an instrument for total expenditure on non durables. We could in theory use household income as an alternative instrument. In some context, this might even be more appealing, as it varies between households. A second possibility is to impute wages using age, education, village dummies and the median village agricultural wage. The third possibility is to use some proxy for the variation in relative prices using some other price.
Here we chose to control for price di¤erences by conditioning on indicators of region and time. This amounts to allowing for intercept shifts by region*time in an AIDS, and for intercept shifs as well as for di¤erent coe¢ cients on log total expenditure and its square in a QUAIDS. Let r i ; i = 1; :::; 14 be the interactions between the 7 regions and the 2 time periods. In an AIDS, the budget share of food is written as:
In a QUAIDS:
Engel curve for food
In this section, we implement what we discuss above and estimate Engel curves for food. The randomised design of the programme opens an additional avenue of investigation. It gives the possiblity of establishing the properties of the Engel on the control localities, and to test whether the Engel curves are stable between control and treated localities. Our discussion is therefore organized as follows. We …rst address the set of methodological issues mentioned above, investigating the properties of the food Engel curve in controls localities, that is in the absence of PROGRESA/Oportunidades. We investigage whether an AIDS or a QUAIDS representation is appropriate;
whether to instrument total expenditure and if it is found to be necessary, which instrument to use; how to control for the conditional requirement that children attend school; whether to control for unobserved prices and whether to do so using village level indicators or region level indicators.
We then show that the Engel curve is 'di¤erent'in treatment localities.
As the two sets of localities are statistically identical, as it has been showed repeatedly, we infer that the Engel curve is 'shifted'by the programme.
In the next step, we move on to show how to …t the data from treatment localities, that is how to modify the Engel curves to take into account the presence of the programme.
Finally, we speculate on how to interpret the shift in Engel curves we document.
Engel curve in control villages
In reporting the results we obtain investigating the food Engel curve, we focus on the shape of the relationship between the food share and the log of total expenditure. For this reason, we will report the coe¢ cients on log total expenditure obtained under di¤erent approaches. The complete set of results, which include the coe¢ cients on the control variables, is available upon request.
As discussed above, we deal with several issues: the shape of the Engel curves, the endogeneity of schooling and total expenditure and whether controlling for price variation across di¤erent regions makes a di¤erence.
Our approach is to present the results of di¤erent speci…cations and test the various alternatives. To deal with endogeneity, we will be using a control function approach which can be easily adapted to the linear and quadratic case. To implement the control function, as for Instrumental Variables, we need 'instruments'. We start by discussing the …rst stage regressions for schooling and total expenditure.
First stage regressions
The main purpose of this sub-section is to check whether the instruments we consider for schooling and total expenditure have additional explanatory power to explain the variability in the endogenous variable. We start with the two schooling variables: the number of children in primary school and the number of children in junior and senior high school. The results we summarize here are in Table A1 When we turn to the …rst stage regressions for total log expenditure, table A2 in the appendix. The …rst column gives the results obtained when using the median village agricultural wage as instrument for total expenditure and the second using income. We …nd that village median agricultural wage has power in explaining total expenditure for control households. In particular, the F-statistic for the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on the median agricultural wage and its square are zero in the …rst stage regression for total expenditure is above 30.
The alternative instrument, household income, also has power as instrument for total expenditure: the F-statistic for the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on household income and its square is zero is 60. As with the …rst instrument, we strongly reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of total expenditure. Table 4 shows the results obtained with a speci…cation which is linear in the log of total expenditure. In column 1, total expenditure and schooling are exogenous; in column 2, we allow for endogeneity of schooling; in column 3, we also instrument total expenditure with the median village level agricultural wage, and in column 4 we instrument total expenditure with household income. The results in columns 2 to 4 are obtained using a control function approach. Speci…cally, having estimated a …rst stage regression where the endogenous variables are regressed on all exogenous variables in the regression and the instrument, we add the residuals of this equation and their powers in the second stage regression. Obviously this approach is identical to Instrumental Variables in the linear case, while it will di¤er from IV in the non-linear case. Note that for speci…cations (1), (2), (4), (5), (6) and (8), the sample is trimmed for the bottom and top percentiles of the sample in income, whilst for (3) and (7), it is trimmed for the corresponding values of wage. We have checked that the trimming is without qualitative e¤ect on the results, it has very marginal quantitative e¤ect.
Second stage regressions : Linear speci…cations (AIDS)
In columns 1 to 4, we do not account for the relative di¤erences in prices.
In columns 5 to 8, we repeat the order of columns 1 to 4, but allowing for price di¤erences by adding regional dummies. Notice that theory implies that regional di¤erences in prices are re ‡ected in intercept shifts if the Engel curve is linear. In Table 4 , we report the coe¢ cient on total expenditure and the corresponding t-value for the hypothesis that the coe¢ cient is zero.
The controls that are included in all speci…cations are: number of children in primary school, number of children in secondary and preparatoria school, the number of young children, household size, the square of household size, townsize, education of head of household and education of spouse, an indicator of whether the head of household is indigenous, the age of the head of household. We also control for the fact that either relatives eating with the household, or members of the household eating out, can in ‡uence the budget share of food. An instance of the latter would be if children of the household eat in school.
Several things are apparent from these results. Whether one controls for prices or not, within a linear framework, does not appear to matter greatly.
Instrumenting schooling and especially total expenditure, however, is crucial: the coe¢ cient on total log consumption moves from -0.05 in column (1) to -0.2 in column (3) and (4). Which of the two instruments considered for total expenditure we use does not matter for the point estimates of the coe¢ cient on total consumption. This coe¢ cient, however, is estimated more precisely when total household income is used, especially when we control for regional e¤ects.
The control function approach we use yields as a by-product a test of endogeneity of the variables that are considered as such: in particular, the null hypothesis that the powers of the residuals of a …rst stage regression are jointly zero corresponds to the hypothesis that that variable is exogenous.
Primary school appears to be exogenous in the Engel curve for food, while
we reject the assumption of exogeneity for secondary school attendance. Our preferred speci…cation will be to treat both schooling levels as endogenous in the food Engel curve. The residuals of the …rst order regression for total expenditure are strongly signi…cant in the food budget share equation, therefore rejecting the hypothesis of exogeneity of total expenditure. These results show that, conditional on linearity, food is a necessity.
Preferences are thus not homothetic. If we take the results in the last column as our favourite speci…cation, an increase in total expenditure by 10 percent would decrease the budget share of food by 2 percentage points.
While we do not report the full set of coe¢ cients, the e¤ect of other controls can be summarized as follows. Although members of the household regularly eating out signi…cantly decreases the budget share of food (close to 4 percentage points per member of the household eating out), less than 5% of the households report one or more household members eating out (this is for the whole sample, not only the controls). Regularly hosting outsiders for meals has no signi…cant e¤ect on the budget share of food. Here again, it is the case that very few households are concerned by this, with less than 5% of households reporting the regular presence of outsiders at their table. The e¤ect of other socio-demographic variables are as follows. Children, whether in primary or secondary and preparatoria, decrease the budget share of food, for a given household size. Given that we select households with two adults and any number of children, the positive and signi…cant e¤ect of household size on the budget share of food captures the e¤ect on food of children not in school (either because they are older or because they are not attending school even if of school age). The level of education of the spouse in ‡uences the budget share of food but not that of the head of household. Finally, the budget share of food is on average lower at the second date of observation, in May 1999, than in October 1998.
When we control for di¤erences in regional prices, these results, by and large, hold (cf columns 5 to 8 in table 4). The only noticeable di¤erence is the result we obtain when we control for prices and use average wages in the locality as instrument. In that case, the coe¢ cient on total log expenditure is slightly smaller in absolute value (-0.16) . At the same time, however, the estimate is much less precise, so that our estimate is not signi…cantly di¤er-ent from -0.2, which is what we obtain when ignoring prices or when using individual income as an instrument. The fact that average locality wages only vary across localities explains the fall in precision when we introduce regional dummies in the second stage regression.
Second stage regressions: quadratic speci…cation (QUAIDS)
We now allow for the possibility of non linearity in total expenditure in the Engel curve. The …rst four columns of table 5 give the results obtained without controlling for prices, while the last four report the results obtained from the same speci…cations, but controlling for price di¤erences with regional dummies. In column 1, total expenditure and schooling are exogenous; in column 2, schooling is instrumented, in column 3 schooling is instrumented and total expenditure is instrumented with village median agricultural wage and …nally in column 4, total expenditure is instrumented with income. In the QUAIDS model, if prices are not constant, they interact with both expenditure terms, so that if we control for regional di¤erences, we have to add not only intercept shifts but also 'slope' shifts (cf section 3.4). In the table below, we report the average coe¢ cients. The trimming is done similarly as in the exercise above.
If we do not control for the endogeneity of total expenditure, the quadratic terms in total log consumption seems to be signi…cant, especially when we control for price di¤erences (see columns 2, 5 and 6). However, whenever
we allow for the possibility that total expenditure is endogenous, the significance of the quadratic terms disappears. Total expenditure, appears to be endogenous, in that the terms in the residuals of the …rst stage regression are signi…cant. Our preferred speci…cation, therefore, are those where we instrument both schooling decisions and total expenditure.
The evidence in Table 5 , therefore, indicates that there are no signi…-cant quadratic e¤ects. Not only are the coe¢ cients on the quadratic terms insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero, the …tted Engel curves are not too dissimilar from the linear ones. From this evidence we conclude that the best …t in the control sample for the food Engel curve, is a linear one where both total expenditure and schooling decisions are treated as endogenous. This speci…cation rejects homotheticity and implies that food is a necessity. We have established that the preferred speci…cation for a food Engel curve in the population under study is linear in (log) total expenditure, controlling for relative prices di¤erences using region indicators interacted with a time indicator. We also established that schooling and especially total expenditure should be endogenous. To estimate the coe¢ cients we could use either of the instruments considered, but we obtained more precise estimates with total household income. If we take our estimates at face value we can use the estimated Engel curve and the experimental estimates of the impact of the program on total log expenditure to predict the impact of the program on the food share.
The di¤erence in log total expenditure between treatment and control sample over the two waves of the survey is 6.82-6.71=0. Table 6 below computes, for some of the speci…cations we have considered, the estimated impact, for the total sample and for the two waves separately. Interestingly, the only speci…cation that predicts something similar to the observed impact is the QUAIDS model estimated by OLS, that is ignoring the endogeneity of schooling and, crucially, of total expenditure.
However, the evidence we presented above rejects strongly the exogeneity of total expenditure. We are therefore led to conclude the best speci…cation of the Engel curve estimated on pre-programme data is not able to predict the impact of the programme. Note: In the speci…cations where total expenditure is considered endogenous total household income is used as an instrument. Schooling is also instrumented.
Engel curve on treatment and controls: accounting for the programme
We have thus established that the Engel curve estimated in the absence of the programme cannot predict its impact. From this starting point, we now turn to the issue of how to modify our speci…cation in a parsimonious way so as to …t the impact of the programme. As we are looking at the relationship between the share of food and total log consumption (which is obviously a¤ected by the programme) we can potentially …t a shift in this relationship induced by the programme as an intercept shift or as a shift in the slope of the relationship. We then turn to the data to discriminate between these two possibilities. Table 7 shows that the e¤ect of the programme is best captured by an intercept shift. Starting with our favourite speci…cation (an AIDS model, where price di¤erences are captured by region dummies and where total con-sumption is instrumented by total household income), we let the presence of the programme (in the treatment communities) shift both the intercept and the slope of the relationship between food share and total consumption.
Speci…cally, in column (1) we reproduce the benchmark Engel curve, estimated on controls localities data only. In columns (2) and (3) we report the results obtained in the pooled sample. In particular, we estimate the parameters of the following equation:
where we omit an individual index for simplicity. The variable P takes the value 1 for observations living in treatment villages. The regional dummies r i , as before, capture di¤erences in local relative prices. The vector Z includes a number of controls, such as family composition variables. As in our favourite speci…cation, we consider total expenditure (as well as schooling) as endogenous and estimate the coe¢ cients in equation (7) by a control function approach.
We report our estimates for , , and in Table 7 . A complete set of estimates is available upon request. As expected, the e¤ect of the programme is strongly signi…cant, when entered as an intercept shift. However, when we let the programme shift both the intercept and the slope, only the former is a¤ected signi…cantly. Given these results, we can check whether our new speci…cation …ts the impact of the programme. For such a purpose, we re-do the exercise in Table 6 , but instead of using the speci…cation estimated on pre-programme data, we use the speci…cation in Column (2) in Table 7 . Such a speci…cation predicts that the change on food shares induced by the programme, under the assumption that it has no e¤ect on prices, is given by:
where ln (x) is the impact of the programme on total expenditure. If we take ln (x) = 0:12, the average measured impact in 1998 and 1999, equation (8) 
Interpretation
The fact that the modi…ed Engel curves are able to predict the impact of the programme is not surprising as they are …tted on programme data. A test of our parsimonious representation of the impact of the programme could only be performed with additional data, so as to perform an out-of-sample forecast. It is however interesting to speculate about why the programme would induce a shift in the Engel curve that would ultimately explain the surprising impact of the cash transfers on food shares.
We have already ruled out possible simple explanations of the impact that do not involve changes in the shape of the Engel curve such as an e¤ect on relative prices or non-linearities in the Engel curve. It might therefore be interesting to consider factors, within the programme, that change the nature of the Engel curve.
PROGRESA/Oportunidades is a complex programme involving a number of di¤erent components. In addition to the cash transfers, two components strike as being particularly important in the present context. Bene-7 In theory it would be possible to modify the Engel curve in equation …ciaries of PROGRESA had to attend a number of courses, some of which provided information on nutritional practices. It is therefore possible that such courses changed the taste for food and result in a shift in the intercept of the Engel curve. However, it is worth noting that similar e¤ects on the food budget share are present even in the case of unconditional cash transfer programs, such as in Ecuador (Schady and Rosero, 2008) .
The second feature of PROGRESA that might be important is the fact that the cash transfer is targeted to women. If demand functions are not derived from the maximization of a single utility function but re ‡ect the relative weight of preferences of husband and wives, it is possible that a shift in power towards women might generate the results we have observed.
The evidence we have presented is suggestive in this sense, even because similar impacts are observed in other programmes targeted to women. To test explicitly this theory further work is necessary, however. Two possible approaches come to mind. First, it might be informative to look at similar programmes where the transfer is not targeted to women. At the moment, Second, one can take a more structural approach and model explicitly the e¤ect of di¤erent distribution factors (the targeted cash transfer being one of them) to test the hypothesis that the observed intercept shift can be accounted for within such a framework. Attanasio and Lechene (in progress) using a recent approach suggested by Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2010) , use Progresa and an additional distribution factor to pursue such a strategy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated Engel curves on data from poor Mexican rural families, collected to evaluate a conditional cash transfer programme.
By considering carefully a number of methodological issues including the endogeneity of total expenditure and the possibility of di¤erences in local relative prices, we came to the conclusion that, the best speci…cation for the share of food is linear in log total consumption, which has to be considered as endogenous. The estimation of such a relationship yields results that imply that food is a necessity, so that the share of food should decline with the increase in total consumption induced by the programme.
This result contrasts sharply with the evidence on the impact of the programme, which indicates that the share of food is e¤ectively unchanged.
Similar results have been observed for other similar programmes. We argue that the programme, in addition to increasing total consumption, shifts the Engel curve. Our data indicate that such a shift is well …tted by an intercept shift. We speculate that one of the possible reasons for such a shift could be a shift of power towards women, induced by the fact that the cash transfers are targeted to women.
Evaluating the impact of information on behaviour is important again for the design of cost e¤ective welfare programmes. 
